To date, the tabular-based SCR (Software C o s t Reduction) method has been applied mostly to the development of embedded control systems. This paper describes the successful application of the SCR method, including the SCR* toolset, to a di erent class of system, a COMSEC (Communications Security) device called CD that must correctly manage encrypted communications. The paper summarizes how the tools in SCR* were u s e d to validate and to debug the SCR speci cation and to demonstrate that the speci cation satis es a set of critical security properties. The development of the CD speci cation involved many tools in SCR*: a s p eci cation editor, a c onsistency checker, a simulator, the TAME interface to the theorem prover PVS, and various other analysis tools. Our experience provides evidence that use of the SCR* toolset to develop high-quality requirements speci cations of moderately complex COMSEC systems is both practical and low-cost.
Introduction
COMSEC (Communications Security) devices, devices which manage encrypted communications, are vital to the correct operation of U.S. military systems. CD, the COMSEC device of interest in this paper, is designed to provide cryptographic processing for a U.S. Navy radio receiver. In addition to generating keystreams compatible with another cryptographic device and supporting multiple channels and multiple cryptographic algorithms, CD downloads associated algorithms and keys into working storage, assigns them to designated communication channels, maintains the association between an algorithm and its keys, and clears algorithms and keys from memory. CD, based on a technology called PEIP (Programmable, Embeddable INFOSEC Product) for implementing COMSEC devices in software as well as hardware, presents a new challenge in the development of COMSEC devices. While a solid base of experience exists for implementing trustworthy COMSEC devices in hardware, impleThis work is funded by ONR. For related work, see http://www.chacs.itd.nrl.navy.mil/SCR. menting COMSEC devices in software is rare.
During the last decade, numerous formal methods, many with automated support, have been proposed for developing high assurance software systems. Because studies (e.g., 6]) show that errors, such as security property violations, that are introduced early in system development are both the most common and the most expensive to x, the goal of many formal methods is to discover and eliminate aws during the early stages of system development. While mechanically supported formal methods hold great promise for identifying errors early, the exceptional user expertise and e ort usually required to apply them present a major barrier to their use in the development of practical systems.
The SCR (Software Cost Reduction) method 15, 11] is a formal method which o ers a user-friendly tabular notation for specifying system requirements, and a set of tools called SCR* for detecting, often automatically, a ws in the requirements speci cation. Although originally designed to specify the requirements of safety-critical control systems, SCR can also be used to specify the required behavior of other systems, such as COMSEC systems. To make SCR* useful to practitioners, the tools are designed to be as automatic as possible and to complement and support one another. Included among the tools in SCR* are an automated consistency checker, a simulator, a n d v arious veri cation tools.
To p r o vide a high degree of assurance in the correctness of CD's speci cation, we have applied the SCR method, including the SCR* tools 12, 13, 11] . Our results suggest that applying the SCR method in the development of COMSEC devices of moderate size and complexity is practical, e ective, and low-cost. In approximately one person-month, we w ere able to represent a signi cant subset of a prose requirements document for CD in the the SCR notation and to establish that the SCR speci cation satis es a set of security properties. The product of this e ort is a highquality requirements speci cation in whose correctness we h a ve a high degree of con dence. This requirements speci cation can guide both the development of the source code and the development of test sets for evaluating the conformance of the source code with the system requirements.
The paper is organized as follows. It rst introduces the SCR method and the SCR* toolset in Section 2, and then describes in Section 3 how the tools were applied to CD. Section 4 discusses the results of applying SCR* to the CD speci cation. Finally, section 5 discusses related work, and Section 6 presents our conclusions.
The SCR Method and Tools
The SCR method is a formal method designed to specify and analyze the requirements of safety-critical control systems. Since its introduction in 1978, the SCR requirements method has been applied successfully to a wide range of critical systems, including avionics systems, space systems, telephone networks, and control systems for nuclear power plants. See, e.g., 15, 2 3 , 8 , 7 , 2 2 , 1 9 ].
An SCR requirements speci cation describes both the system environment, which is nondeterministic, and the required system behavior, which is usually deterministic 12, 14] . Quantities in the environment that the system monitors and controls are represented by monitored and controlled variables. SCR specications also use two t ypes of auxiliary variables: mode classes (whose values are called modes) a n d terms, both of which often capture historical information. In the SCR model, the system environment nondeterministically produces a sequence of input events, where an input event is a change in some monitored quantity. The system is represented as a state machine (i.e., automaton) whose current state is determined by the values of the state variables, where a state variable is either a monitored or controlled variable, a mode class, or a term. Executions of the system begin in some initial state, after which the system responds to each i nput event i n t u r n b y c hanging state and by producing zero or more output events, where an output event is a change in a controlled quantity. The system behavior is assumed to be synchronous: the system completely processes one input event before the next input event is processed.
An SCR speci cation de nes the transitions of a system using of a set of tables. Each table describes In addition to tables, an SCR speci cation contains dictionaries of types, variable declarations, constant declarations, environmental assumptions, and specication assertions. The speci cation assertion dictionary records required system properties, e.g., security properties. Our experience with practical systems is that most system properties can be represented as either state invariants or transition invariants, where a state invariant is a property that holds in every reachable state and a transition invariant is a property t h a t holds in every reachable prestate/poststate pair (i.e., reachable transition).
The SCR* toolset 12, 13, 11] is a set of software tools developed by NRL to provide mechanized support for the SCR method. The tools include a specication editor for creating and modifying both an operational requirements speci cation (i.e., a state-machine representation of the required behavior) and a set of properties, such as safety and security properties a dependency graph browser to display the dependencies among the variables in the speci cation an automated consistency checker to expose missing cases, unwanted nondeterminism, and other application-independent errors 12] a simulator to allow users to validate the speci cation an interface to the model checker Spin 16] to detect violations of critical application properties and an invariant generator 18] t h a t computes state invariants from an SCR speci cation. To p r o vide formal underpinnings for the tools and for the analysis techniques the tools implement, a formal model de nes the semantics of SCR requirements speci cations 14, 1 2 ] .
Several additional tools have been recently integrated with SCR* by automatically translating the internal representation of an SCR speci cation into the input languages of the tools. These tools include TAME (Timed Automata Modeling Environment) 1, 2] , an interface to the theorem prover PVS 25] for proving properties of automata models, a validity checker 4] which uses an integrated set of decision procedures to automatically check whether a given property is a state or transition invariant of an SCR speci cation, and a test set generator 9] that automatically generates test sets from an SCR speci cation.
3 Applying SCR* to CD This section describes the translation of a subset of the prose speci cation provided by the CD developers into an SCR speci cation and the results of applying the SCR* tools to the SCR speci cation. The tools and analysis techniques that were applied include the consistency checker, simulator, invariant generator, Spin, TAME, and the validity c hecker. This section also describes our plan to use the SCR* testing tool to automatically construct test sets from the SCR speci cation of CD.
From Prose to SCR Requirements
To develop the SCR speci cation, we studied the CD Systems Requirement D o c u m e n t (SRD) provided by the CD project manager, focusing on the constraints it imposed on the required system behavior and representing those constraints using SCR constructs. The CD SRD, a traditional 2167A-style document, was sufciently precise and complete about key and algorithm management, modes of operation, and security requirements relating to power, tampering, and zeroizing for us to capture the required behavior in the SCR specication of CD. We obtained security properties by examining the SCR speci cation and surmising the goals of the required behavior and by interpreting descriptions of functions in the CD SRD as security requirements. The CD project manager has reviewed the set of security properties that we formulated and conrmed that, except for one, they are reasonable security properties of CD. The exception, according to the project manager, wa s a p r o p e r t y whose hypothesis (backup power is over voltage), would never be satised. Our SCR speci cation describes the part of CD's behavior (as described in the SRD) that is consistent w i t h the SCR model of black-box requirements. In SCR, the CD behavior is described in terms of inputs (the status of primary and backup power, data provided by the host, and positions of switches), outputs (indicator lights and status messages), and modes. In addition, our speci cation describes some memory management behavior that goes beyond SCR's usual modeling of black-box requirements. Usually, in SCR, memory is considered to be internal to the black box, and thus invisible from the outside, but we treat it as externally visible by de ning controlled variables that represent the memory locations in which the CD software can store algorithms and keys. This memory management behavior models the rules in the CD SRD for loading algorithms and keys, associating them with channels, and clearing them from memory. There is (intentionally) not enough information in the CD SRD to specify the rules for cryptographic synchronization and generating keystreams. As a result, our SCR speci cation omits some required behavior that would be relevant and useful to reason about.
The CD SRD assumes that an unlimited numberof algorithms and keys can be distributed among an unspeci ed number of storage locations and an unspeci ed number of channels. In the SCR speci cation, we assume that there are two key banks, each with two key storage locations at most 1,000 di erent algorithms and 1,000 di erent keys and two channels. The SCR CD speci cation has one more mode than described in the CD SRD: we add an O mode so that the system is always in exactly one mode. Our SCR speci cation contains 39 variables|17 monitored variables, one mode class, two terms, and 19 controlled variables. Figure 1 shows the variable dependency graph for the complete SCR speci cation of CD. Variables are represented as boxes, and an arrow from one variable to a second variable indicates that the value of the rst variable in the new state depends on the value of the second variable in either the current state or the new state. The heavy lines are backarrows the number of backarrows re ects the complexity of the dependencies among the variables, which is also re ected in the complexities of the tables. Although this graph has cycles, the SCR* consistency checker was used to assure that there were no circular dependencies among the \new-state" variables (see Section 3.2).
Most of the e ort spent in building the SCR specication of CD took place as a background activity o ver a nine-month period. The initial build of the speci cation required approximately one person-week. About one additional person-week was needed to re ne and complete the speci cation, with frequent use of the consistency checker (see Section 3.2).
Applying the Consistency Checker
The consistency checker uses static analysis techniques to expose syntax and type errors, variable name discrepancies, unwanted nondeterminism (called disjointness errors), missing cases (called coverage errors), and circular de nitions (i.e., cycles in the dependencies among new-state variables). The checks are fully automatic and thus require no user input or guidance. When an error is detected, the consistency checker facilitates error correction by p r o viding detailed feedback. For some types of errors (e.g., disjointness and coverage errors), the checker, in addition to describing the error, will highlight where in the speci cation the error occurs, and display a transition or state that demonstrates the error.
The consistency checker may b e u s e d a t a n y stage in the development of a speci cation. All checks, except those for missing cases and nondeterminism, execute in a few seconds and are typically invoked many times during an editing session. In developing the CD speci cation, we frequently used the less expensive consistency checks as \sanity" checks. Since applying the more expensive c hecks for missing cases and nondeterminism to the entire CD speci cation usually requires between ve and nine minutes, we i n voked these checks less frequently. Figure 2 gives an example of an error message generated by the consistency checker during our development of the SCR speci cation of CD. The rst column gives the error message displayed by the tool. The second and third columns describe the part of the speci cation that is highlighted at user request and our diagnosis of the error. In this example, the error is a circular de nition, i.e., a cycle among the new state dependencies. This cycle occurred on our rst attempt to describe CD's mode transitions in cases where the prose requirements described entry into a mode as ultimately resulting in exit from that mode to some other mode.
Simulating the CD Speci cation
In contrast to other tools in SCR*, which are for veri cation, the simulator is a tool for validation. The purpose of veri cation is to prove that the speci cation satis es selected system properties, such as state and transition invariants the purpose of validation is to con rm that the speci cation captures the operational system behavior intended by the customer. The simulator permits application experts to validate the behavior de ned by the speci cation before the system is built. They can do so by running scenarios through the simulator rather than by reading the detailed SCR speci cation.
A scenario is a sequence of input events, each of which assigns a new value to one of the monitored variables. For each input event in the sequence, the simulator updates the values of the dependent variables before processing the next input event. In addition to presenting the current state of the execution, the simulator can present a history of the execution and report when a scenario violates speci ed properties.
The simulator's standard generic interface presents the current state of an execution in terms of the current values of the state variables, i.e., the monitored variables, mode classes, terms, and controlled variables. A disadvantage of the generic interface is that it presents an abstract description of the system state that application experts nd unnatural. To o vercome this problem, the simulator supports the rapid construction of graphical front-ends customized for particular applications. Each application-speci c front-end contains graphical representations of switches, indicator lights, dials, and other entities in the human-computer interface that, in contrast to the generic interface, clearly and directly communicate information about the system behavior to the user.
We found an application-speci c front-end for CD useful in interacting with the CD project manager. After viewing a simulation of CD using the CD-speci c front-end (built in less than a day), the CD project manager provided us with useful feedback o n t h e S C R speci cation of the CD. Thus, evaluation of the CD speci cation through this front-end to the simulator allowed a very e ective use of a very scarce commodity, the project manager's time.
Automatic Invariant Generation
where C i is a predicate de ned in terms of variables on which v depends. When v can take values in a very large (even in nite) set, the hypotheses v = a i are replaced by predicates de ning a nite partition on the range of v for example, when v h a s a n umeric value, each predicate will de ne an interval. The appropriate intervals can often be computed automatically from the speci cation by i d e n tifying the values with which v is compared.
The automatic invariant generator currently provided in SCR* partially implements the algorithm for generating invariants from a mode transition table. The full algorithm, which we currently execute by hand, includes methods for generating invariants from event tables and condition tables and a strengthened method for mode transition tables it will ultimately be implemented in SCR*. Figure 3 lists the nontrivial invariants that were generated automatically from the mode transition Although the invariants generated from the specication are not the strongest possible invariants, they are often su cient to establish interesting safety properties 18]. While applying the full invariant generation algorithm to CD did not provide results su cient by themselves to establish the security properties we wished to verify, the generated invariants did play a n extremely useful role: they provided every auxiliary lemma we needed to complete the proofs of all valid security properties that we i n vestigated. Although there is no guarantee that this will always happen, that it did happen for CD suggests that applying invariant generation is a useful rst step in verifying a set of properties, particularly since, once the full algorithm is implemented in SCR*, invariant generation will be fully automatic.
Three of the seven properties that we analyzed could not be proven automatically with either TAME or the SCR* validity checker (see Sections 3.6 and 3.7). To prove these properties, a total of ve auxiliary invariants were needed. Of these ve i n variants, which are listed in Figure 4 , invariants 1A, 2A, and 3A can be derived from invariants generated by the implemented algorithm. For example, invariant 1A is implied by invariant 4 in Figure 3 , one of the invariants generated automatically from the mode transition table for smOperation. Invariant 4A follows immediately from additional invariants which w ere generated by h a n d u sing the strengthened algorithm for mode transition tables. The contrapositive o f invariant 5 A is generated by applying the algorithm by hand to the event t a b l e de ning the integer-valued variable cKeyBank1Key1. 
Model Checking Properties
When, as in SCR, a software speci cation describes a nite-state automaton, one can model check its properties. Model checking performs an exhaustive s e a r c h of the state space of the automaton. If the number of state variables is large, and particularly if|as is common in software speci cations|the individual variables take v alues in a large (even in nite) set, the state space can become so large that direct exhaustive search o f t h e e n tire space is di cult or impossible. This problem, referred to as the state explosion problem, can often be alleviated by abstraction.
For SCR*, we h a ve developed automatable abstraction methods that reduce the state space either by eliminating variables irrelevant to a property ( variable restriction) or by reducing the range of variable values (variable abstraction) 5, 11]. When, as often happens, even abstraction does not allow the state space to be searched exhaustively, a partial search o f t h e s t a t e space can often nd states that violate a speci ed property. In addition to nding property violations, most model checkers produce counterexamples in the form of scenarios (i.e., execution sequences) that lead to the bad state. Below, we refer to counterexample scenarios simply as counterexamples.
Since model checking is largely automatic, using a model checker to check the validity of a property before trying to establish the property with a theorem prover is often a useful screening strategy. If Spin nds a violation, it produces a counterexample, thus saving the e ort needed to generate a counterexample from a dead-end in a proof. In checking security properties for CD, we followed this strategy. Figure 5 lists seven security properties that the SCR speci cation of CD satis es. Before we tried to prove any CD security property with TAME (see Section 3.6), we rst used the Spin model checker to search for violations of the property. For each property, we used SCR* to automatically extract an abstraction from the CD speci cation and the property, using the variable restriction method described in 5, 11] to remove all variables irrelevant to the validity o f t h e property. Then, by hand, we applied the variable abstraction method described in 11]. By limiting the range of values that certain variables can assume, this method usually produces a smaller abstraction. In our CD study, the abstractions for di erent properties varied very little. A t ypical abstraction contained 28 variables, a reduction of 28% from the 39 variables in the complete SCR speci cation.
Using Spin, we discovered a few property violations. In each case, closer examination of the property s h o wed that the formulation of the property w as incorrect. As one would expect, model checking was unable to nd any violations of the properties subsequently veri ed by theorem proving. Because the model checker ran out of memory before the analysis was complete, we were unable to search the complete state space of any o f the abstract speci cations and therefore to verify any of the properties listed in Figure 5 . The importance of the theorem proving phase was demonstrated when we were able to use theorem proving both to prove that certain properties were invariants and to establish that one property for which Spin was unable to nd a violation is not an invariant (see below).
Checking Properties with TAME
The tool TAME provides an interface to PVS for proving properties of automata models. TAME's goal is to reduce the human e ort required in using PVS to specify these automata models and to prove state invariant properties for the models. TAME was originally designed to specify and reason about LynchVaandrager (LV) timed automata 21] but has been adapted to I/O automata 20] and the automata model underlying SCR (see 2]). TAME provides more than twenty specialized strategies that implement proof steps mimicking the high-level proof steps typically used by humans in proving invariant properties. Experience has shown that for automata models whose state variables have simple types (such as numerical, boolean, or enumerated types), nearly all state invariants can be proved using the TAME steps exclusively.
We have i n tegrated TAME into SCR* by developing an automatic SCR-to-TAME translator and special TAME strategies for the automatic analysis of properties of SCR automata 2]. For many SCR automata| in particular, those not involving timing constraints or other complexities such as tolerances for controlled quantities|a single TAME strategy can automatically prove many state invariants.
As stated in Section 2, most invariant properties of interest for an SCR automaton are either state invariants (one-state properties) or transition invariants (two-state properties). State invariants are typically proved by induction, with a base case for the initial states and an action case for each kind of input event. Although induction can be used in proving transition invariants, it is seldom appropriate, since the transitions possible from any given state seldom have any connection to the transitions possible from one of its successor states. Rather, transition invariants are normally proved by reasoning directly about the transition relation of the SCR automaton.
In TAME, the strategy SCR INDUCT PROOF performs the standard parts of an induction proof for a state invariant, and SCR DIRECT PROOF does the same for a transition invariant. A universal invariant proof strategy identi es the invariant as either a one-state or two-state property and then applies either SCR INDUCT PROOF or SCR DIRECT PROOF as appropriate.
Properties 1, 2, and 3 in Figure 5 took a few days to prove because the initial TAME representation of CD combined with the initial versions of the strategies SCR INDUCT PROOF and SCR DIRECT PROOF led to unmanageably large data structures in the PVS prover. These problems led us to improve both our translation scheme and our proof strategies. After these improvements were made, we w ere able to prove properties 5, 6, and 7 in Figure 5 in less than an hour. The proof of property 4 took longer|about 2 days| because we needed to discover and to prove two layers of auxiliary invariants. This time would have been greatly reduced if the full invariant generation algorithm (see Section 3.4) had been automated. When TAME's universal invariant strategy fails to complete the proof of an invariant, two possibilities exist: either the invariant is false, or additional invariants are needed in the proof. Associated with every proof \dead-end" is a problem transition. For onestate properties, this is the transition of the action case in the induction proof in which the dead-end appears. For two-state properties, this is the transition from the given state via some enabled automaton action to the successor state the strategy SCR DIRECT PROOF produces only dead-ends in which the action is known, and hence for deterministic SCR speci cations, the successor state (in terms of the given state) is known. TAME provides an analysis strategy to display the details of any problem transition. Once these details are understood, the user can determine whether the transition is reachable|in which case, the property is false| or whether it is unreachable, either because it would violate some transition invariant, or because one or the other of the states in the transition violates some state invariant.
Applying abstraction to a speci cation is less important in theorem proving than in model checking. Since a theorem prover can reason about abstract values, reducing the range of a variable using variable abstraction results in little or no improvement in the number of cases the theorem prover must consider. However, variable restriction can reduce both the numberof cases and the complexity of reasoning about state transitions. Therefore, prior to analyzing a property w i t h TAME, we applied variable restriction to the specication. Because the resulting abstractions for the individual properties were very similar, we used the same abstraction for all.
Applying the TAME strategies to the seven properties in Figure 5 resulted in the automatic proof of four of the properties. For two of the remaining properties, we proposed an auxiliary invariant, which was proved automatically and then applied to complete the proof. Property 1 i n Figure 5 is an example of a property requiring a single auxiliary invariant, invariant 5A in Figure 4 , in its proof. Examination of the event table for the variable cKeyBank1Key1, in Figure 6 shows why the auxiliary invariant is needed: 1 when CD is in mode sOff, t h e e v ent @T(mTamper) does not change the value of cKeyBank1Key1. I n variant 5A, which states that cKeyBank1Key1 is 0 in mode sOff, clearly covers this case. In the case of the third remaining property, w e suggested an auxiliary invariant that completed the proof. However, applying the automatic proof strategy to the auxiliary invariant resulted in several dead-ends, and we therefore proposed three additional auxiliary invariants. These three new invariants were then proved automatically using the universal invariant strategy. As noted in Section 3.4, each o f t h e needed auxiliary invariants was subsumed or implied by i n variants that either were, or could be, generated automatically. Thus, once the invariant generator is extended and communication between the invariant generator and TAME is possible, the class of invariants that can be proved automatically using TAME will be extended. Figure 7 shows a proposed eighth property that does not hold in the CD speci cation. Although Spin was unable to produce a counterexample for this property, T AME's analysis of the property found 14 problem transitions. Some intelligent exploration using the SCR* simulator produced a scenario that leads to one of these transitions, thus demonstrating that the property does not hold in the SCR speci cation. Detailed examination of the feedback from TAME shows that no obvious invariants forbid the other problem transitions, so it is likely that they also correspond to counterexamples.
Applying the Validity Checker
The SCR* validity c hecker VC 4 ] c hecks the validity of rst-order one-state or two-state properties directly by using an initial term-rewriting phase followed by application of a decision procedure that uses BDDs (binary decision diagrams) to evaluate propositional formulae and a constraint solver to reduce simple integer arithmetic formulae (Presburger formulae). The variable ordering used in the BDDs is particularly efcient for SCR speci cations. VC can also perform an induction proof of a property by rst applying a preprocessor to generate the appropriate base and induction cases and then applying the direct method to the generated cases. An automatic translation of SCR speci cations into input for VC has been built.
VC has been applied to many of the same examples to which TAME has been applied, including the CD properties (after abstraction, as with TAME). The run time required by V C to analyze the CD properties was about half the time required by TAME. For the false property in Figure 7 , VC produced a single problem transition, a special case of one of the 14 problem transitions reported by T AME. This is the same problem transition for which w e used the simulator to nd a c o u n terexample. Thus, VC, like T AME, can be used in demonstrating that a property i s i n valid.
Unlike T AME, VC cannot be used to prove properties interactively. Therefore, the CD properties whose proofs required auxiliary invariants were checked after rst including all necessary auxiliary invariants as assumptions, rather than by interactively invoking an analog of TAME's strategy for applying an invariant lemma. Mechanically checking the validity o f complex properties (such as properties involving nonlinear numerical constraints or numerical constraints over real numbers, or properties whose proofs require types of higher-order reasoning other than induction over reachable states) requires a general-purpose theorem prover, such as PVS through TAME. However, VC can provide an e cient rst screening for invariance for any property of an automaton that involves only propositional logic, simple integer constraints, and universal quanti cation over states or state pairs.
Generating Test Sets
Applying the formal techniques described above produces very high-quality requirements speci cations. Although such high-quality requirements speci cations are valuable, the ultimate objective o f the software development process is to produce high-quality software|software that satis es its requirements. To weed out errors introduced by the implementation and to convince customers that the system performance is acceptable, the software needs to be tested. An enormous problem, however, is that software testing, especially of secure systems, is extremely costly and timeconsuming. It has been estimated that current t e s t i n g methods consume between 40% and 70% of the software development e ort 3].
The high-quality speci cation produced by t h e S C R method can play a v aluable role in software testing. We have developed an automated technique 9] that constructs a suite of test sets from an SCR requirements speci cation. Each test set is a sequence of system inputs in which e a c h input is coupled with the required system outputs. To ensure that the test sets \cover" the set of all possible system behaviors, our technique organizes all possible system executions (i.e., traces) into equivalence classes and builds one or more test sets for each class. These test sets can then be used to automatically evaluate the implemented software. By reducing the human e ort needed to build and to run the test sets, such an approach can reduce both the enormous cost and the signi cant time and human e ort associated with current testing methods.
With our technique, a model checker's ability t o p r oduce counterexamples is used to construct the test sets. The requirements speci cation is used both to generate a valid sequence of inputs and as an oracle that determines the outputs the system is required to generate from a given system input. To obtain a valid sequence of inputs, the input sequence is constrained to satisfy the environmental assumptions in the SCR requirements speci cation.
We have built a prototype tool in Java t h a t automatically translates an SCR speci cation into the language of either of two model checkers, executes the model checker to build the test sets, analyzes its outputs, and nally produces a le containing the generated test sets. Our prototype tool has been applied to a number of speci cations, including a sizable component o f a c o n tractor-speci ed weapons system 11]. Given the tool's early success in constructing test sets e ciently, w e expect that applying the tool to the CD speci cation should be equally successful. The CD project manager has expressed interest in using test sets generated by our tool to test the CD software.
Discussion
The Complexity of CD. Our SCR speci cation of CD re ects the application's signi cant complexity a n d moderate size. As noted in Section 3.1, the SCR speci cation has 39 variables, and the relationships among these variables is complex. In any state after the initial state, the monitored variable mHostCommand can take one of 17 Time and e ort required. Despite the complexity of CD, the total time taken in this study to develop and analyze the SCR CD speci cation was only one person-month. 2 Formalizing the speci cation of CD in SCR, including the use of the analysis tools to perform sanity checks, took only two person-weeks, and even the most complex consistency checks ran in minutes. The graphical front-end for simulation of CD was constructed in one day. Improvements to formulation of the properties based on feedback from the model checker took only a few days. TAME and the validity checker underwent signi cant improvement during our analysis of the SCR speci cation of CD, and as a result, analyzing a property with these tools now t a k es at most a few minutes, and sometimes only a few seconds. The most labor-intensive part of the analysis of a property is analyzing proof dead-ends to determine their cause and their resolution. As noted above, we plan to fully implement the invariant generation algorithm. This extension of SCR* should reduce signi cantly the problem of discovering useful auxiliary invariants.
The practicality of SCR. For our SCR speci cation of CD, we analyzed eight security properties. For each property, w e w ere able to de nitively answer the question, \Does the operational speci cation satisfy this property?" When the answer was \No," we p r o vided a counterexample illustrating the failure. Although the full set of security properties for CD (to which w e d o not have access) numbers in the hundreds, our success with the properties we considered and the relatively short time required support the proposition that SCR and the analysis techniques supported in SCR* provide a practical, low-cost approach t o providing high assurance. Typical concerns expressed by practitioners regarding the practicality of formal methods are addressed in more detail in our discussion in 17] o f t h e lessons we learned from our application of the SCR* tools to CD.
5 Related Work RSML (Requirements State Machine Language) 10] is another requirements method in which, as in SCR, a system is speci ed as a state machine. RSML has been successfully applied to nding errors in the specication of a complex avionics system: the Tra c alert and Collision Avoidance System II (TCAS II). Like SCR speci cations, RSML speci cations include a set of tables and may be checked for consistency and for (a version of) completeness. SCR and RSML also have important di erences. First, RSML has a Statechartsstyle interface through which it explicitly supports speci cation features, such as hierarchical states and local variables, not explicitly supported in SCR (although similar e ects can be obtained with SCR). Further, the AND/OR tables in RSML specify details of transitions, while SCR tables specify how dependent state variables are updated. Because a state machine has many more transitions than state variables, an RSML speci cation of a system contains many more tables than an SCR speci cation of the same system. Finally, automated support for the analysis of RSML speci cation properties beyond consistency and completeness is not yet extensive.
Reference 24] describes an earlier application of SCR to the development of another COMSEC device, the External COMSEC Adaptor (ECA). The development, from modeling the device through implementing and verifying its design, was done using the highlevel SCR method, but not the SCR* toolset. The operational requirements were speci ed using SCR tables, and the critical requirements model|the desired properties|was speci ed using the CSP (Communicating Sequential Processes) language. In this e ort, both formal and informal transitions between stages were used, with some automated support for the formal transitions from another mechanized theorem prover. 6 Conclusion SCR o ers a practical, low-cost approach to building a high assurance COMSEC device. Before implementation and design, the SCR* toolset can be used to build and analyze, often automatically, a mathematically precise requirements speci cation. Operational personnel can use the SCR* simulator to validate the behavior of the speci ed system. Further, model checking often can be used to identify security properties which the operational speci cation violates, and theorem proving can be used to verify the correctness of security properties and suggest possible property violations. When analyses have established sucient con dence in the requirements speci cation, the system can be built to satisfy that speci cation. A planned extension to SCR*, a tool to generate Java code from speci cations, will help with this phase of development. Once the source code is available, test sets automatically generated from the operational requirements speci cation by the test set generator can be used to test the system implementation.
